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A HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES AND
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
MORTON J. HORWITZ*
Dan Hamilton asked me to lead off with a discussion of the historiography of The People Themselves. 1 My dominant focus will be on situating
Larry Kramer's historical claims among the various interpretative arguments about the history of judicial review. But before I do that, let me first
underline the obvious point that Larry is intervening in a growing contemporary debate about the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional
system that began to emerge after the end of the Warren Court and reached
a crescendo with Bush v. Gore.2 For the second time since Lochner v. New
York 3 was decided, some liberals have begun once again to switch sides on
the virtues of judicial review. Many recent liberal books and articles inevitably bring to mind the flood of Progressive attacks on the democratic legitimacy of judicial review written between 1905 and 1937.
For those who believe that "principle" transcends politics and context-I don't count myself among them-the current revival of anti-judicial
review sentiment among liberals smacks of political opportunism and, as a
result, they dismiss as "present-minded" any constitutional history that
advances the new liberal agenda. But once we recognize that revisionist
constitutional history has almost always been triggered by fundamental
challenges to whatever paradigms were then dominant in constitutional
law, it should remain possible for us to evaluate that history on its own
terms, independent of its effect on current debates.
The People Themselves can be approached independently of its clear
effort to advance one version of the current anti-judicial review agenda.
Yet, while I entirely acknowledge that most paradigm-shattering books on
the history of the Supreme Court have always been intimately connected to
contemporary debates, I do wish that Larry had split off one or two chapters on contemporary debates in order to appease the still widespread fear

* Charles Warren Professor of American Legal History, Harvard Law School.
1. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004).

2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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that historians with a political agenda will inevitably succumb to the temptations of present-mindedness.
I found the book's historical claims to be bold, exciting, and illuminating, its evidence to be grounded in wide reading of the historical sources,
both primary and secondary, and its nuanced portrayal of historical change
to be very impressive, especially for a law professor. Kramer has two overall goals. The first is to establish that a legitimate practice of popular constitutionalism--of the "people outdoors" exercising a separate and
independent voice in constitutional debate-was well in place by the time
of the American Revolution. The second goal is to demonstrate that the
arguments for judicial supremacy--expressly articulated in Cooper v.
Aaron4 and acted upon in Bush v. Gore 5-have been drowned out until
recently by a "departmental" theory of judicial review. The claim that judicial supremacy is a very recent development in constitutional history is not
new, but Kramer's elaboration of the various paths to judicial supremacy
and the real life significance of the competing theories of judicial review
left behind is a real eye-opener.
We begin with what seems to me to be Kramer's most original-and
controversial-claim: that during the colonial period "popular constitutionalism" endowed the "people out of doors" with the legitimate power to
interpret an unwritten, customary constitution embodying fundamental law
as English Whigs had understood it during and after the Glorious Revolution of 1689. What were the institutional mechanisms for realizing popular
constitutionalism? Popular constitutionalism certainly did not include judicial review of legislation, which, at least in a form we would recognize
today, was not practiced during the colonial period. His reading of Coke's
opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case6 as an instance of statutory interpretation,
not judicial review, is now standard. But he also contests both Raoul Berger's further assertion that, whatever the correct reading, the case "became
a rallying cry for Americans" during the 1760s, 7 as well as Tom Grey's
claim that the case was treated as authority for a "judicially enforceable
higher law" and became a direct forerunner of judicial review. 8 "Practically
the only evidence ever cited" for these propositions, Kramer maintains, is

4. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
5. 531 U.S. 98.
6. (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.).
7. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 21 (citing RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V.THE SUPREME COURT 25
(1969)).
8. Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv, 843, 868 (1978).
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the argument of James Otis in the Writs of Assistance Case.9 And he argues
still further that even Otis should be read to espouse the limited version of
what was held in Bonham's Case. "[T]he most telling fact," he concludes,
"is how little evidence supports the idea that Coke or Dr. Bonham were
important to Americans in developing the principle of judicial review." 10
These are unorthodox conclusions that await confirmation of
Kramer's evidentiary claims. One thing that does give me pause is
Kramer's treatment of Bonham's Case as standing alone in England. He
jumps more than a century to Blackstone's effort to interpret Coke's statement even more narrowly so as to render it compatible with the emerging
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.
But, as Gough notes, in the seventy-five years between the Glorious
Revolution and Blackstone's Commentaries, there were a number of statements by English jurists who did read Coke as authority for judicial review
based on fundamental law.'1While political practice during this period did
increasingly trend towards acknowledgement of the supremacy of Parliament, Blackstone was the first to theorize this practice as illustrative of an
uncontested constitutional principle of parliamentary supremacy. On
Gough's reading, then, English constitutional theory never completely
abandoned fundamental law through most of the period leading up to the
American Revolution. That is why Bailyn is able to portray Otis as driven
mad by the contradictions in English constitutional theory. 12 Moreover, is it
plausible that eighteenth century colonials could have been so wedded to
the English Whigs' version of a customary constitution without also grabbing onto suggestions that it did imply judicial review? Still, if Kramer is
right that Bonham's Case was rarely cited in America, it is hard to believe
that he could be wrong in ignoring the significance of Gough's collection
of eighteenth century English jurists who did cite the Case as authority for
"judicially enforceable higher law."
Another possible problem with Kramer's formulation is that it marginalizes the theory of mixed government, which dominated English constitutional theory after the Glorious Revolution, and which John Adams
continued, right up to the Revolution, to believe was the true model of the
eighteenth century British constitution. The prevalence in eighteenth century England of an idealized version of a mixed constitution may provide
9. See M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 543 (1978).

10. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 23.
11.

See generally J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

(1955).
12. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

(1992).
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the explanation for why no one talked of parliamentary supremacy before
Blackstone. And even evolving political practice was largely about the
relations between Crown and Parliament, not about the role of judges vis-Avis Parliament. It may also explain why the not infrequent references to
higher law in Blackstone's Commentaries coexist uneasily with his clear
statements in support of parliamentary supremacy.
It is also possible that judicial review entered the American consciousness through another, more indirect route that Kramer does not mention. If, as Kramer says, eighteenth century colonial legislatures emulated
Parliament in passing few general laws, then perhaps we need to refocus
our attention on the bulk of its activity that today we would call private
laws. Without going so far as to extend Mcllwain's idea that medieval and
early modem Parliaments thought of themselves as courts and of the passage of private laws as adjudications, 13 we need to recall that the Massachusetts legislature is still called the Great and General Court. And as
Barbara Black has shown, 1 4 the Massachusetts legislature did actually
serve as the highest court of appeals during the colonial era and until several decades after the Revolution. This practice also continued in most of
the New England states until the 1820s. Calder v. Bull, 15 let us remember,
was brought to the Supreme Court after the Connecticut legislature, acting
as the state's highest court, ordered a new trial. Many of the earliest cases
of conventional judicial review in the states were assertions by their supreme courts that separation of powers barred legislatures from serving as
appellate courts. To overstate the point for emphasis, if most colonial legislation consisted of private laws, which were once thought of as adjudications, they could have been reviewed by legislatures acting as courts, under
the radar screen of modem conceptions of separation of powers.
If Kramer is correct in claiming that during the colonial period "the
people outdoors" were expected to enforce a customary Whig constitution,
what institutional mechanisms were deployed for that purpose? Many of
his examples of appeals to the people as guardians of fundamental law can
be taken as no more than abstract Lockean rhetoric, but Kramer insists that
they were more than mere Lockean appeals to nature after dissolution of
the social contract. "It was, rather," he emphasizes, "the invocation of a
specific set of legal remedies by which 'the people'-conceived as a col-

13. See generally CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS
SUPREMACY (1910).
14. See Barbara Aronstein Black, Massachusetts and the Judges: Judicial Independence in Perspective, 3 LAW& HIST. REV.101 (1985).
15. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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lective body capable of independent action-were empowered to enforce
the constitution against errant rulers."' 6 First and foremost, were elections.
It is essential for Kramer that elections not be reduced to legislative
supremacy but instead be conceived of as one of many regular means of
forcing governmental officials, including legislators, to adhere to constitutional values. Together with petitioning and "mobbing,"-crowd actionselections were among the "specific legal remedies" for enforcing the customary constitution by the "people outdoors." After elections, perhaps the
most effective remedy of the people against the unconstitutional action of
their governors was the undoubted power of many colonial juries to determine both law and fact, including passing on challenges to the constitutionality of laws.
Enough has been said to see how different Kramer's picture of colonial constitutionalism is from the now standard accounts of Bailyn and
Wood. All agree that in England on the eve of the American Revolution,
judicial review had been marginalized and parliamentary sovereignty had
become the constitutional norm. But both Bailyn and Wood emphasize that
the small "c" English constitution was then understood not as a body of
fundamental law but as a frame of government. For them, the emergence of
the idea of a Constitution as embodying fundamental law is one of the
paramount achievements of the American Revolution. 17
For Kramer, on the other hand, colonial Americans continued to take
seriously the seventeenth century Whig idea of fundamental law as a set of
what he calls enforceable "political-legal" constraints on governors, 18 not
including judicial review.
If for Bailyn and Wood the basic change in political theory brought
about by the American Revolution was the shift from British parliamentary
to American popular sovereignty, for Kramer popular sovereignty was
already a powerful force even before the conflicts leading up to the Revolution. If Bailyn and Wood see the first post-revolutionary written state constitutions as expressions of the recent emergence of the idea of popular
sovereignty, Kramer significantly down-plays their significance. He sees
their having been written down as primarily an effort to avoid ambiguity,
not as the first recognition of their legally binding authority.
It is at this point that a major gap in Kramer's argument appears.
Though it would seem that provision for constitutional amendment would
16. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 25.
17. See generally BAILYN, supra note 12; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).
18. See generally KRAMER, supra note 1, at 9-34.
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follow from his conception of popular constitutionalism, he points out that
by 1780 fewer than half of the states had included such a provision in their
constitutions, and that even by 1787 five states still had no amendment
clause. 19 What is one to make of this omission?
Perhaps it illustrates Michael Kammen's idea that prevailing Newtonian ideas led the state framers to believe they were creating a "machine
that would go of itself."'20 Perhaps it represents a conception of fundamental law as static and unchanging. Or perhaps it illustrates the continuing
vitality of natural law ideas as expressions of "self-evident truths" derived
from "the laws of nature and nature's God."
This last point requires some elaboration. Before Bailyn and Wood
placed sovereignty at center stage in their renditions of the political theory
of the American Revolution, most of the distinctive features of American
constitutionalism had been explained as a result of American attachment to
natural law/natural rights ideas. In the course of the eighteenth century, it
was argued, while English jurists marginalized natural law arguments,
Americans had continued to immerse themselves in the natural law philosophies of Grotius, Vatel, and Puffendorf. The Declaration of Independence was thus regarded as the culmination of American natural law ideas
that were waiting in the wings to be invoked beginning with the Stamp Act
Crisis of 1763. Thus, the greatest of American constitutional historians,
Edward Corwin, could write a book entitled The "Higher Law" Back-

2
ground ofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw. '

As with so many paradigm shifts in scholarly fields, Bailyn and Wood
never confronted this earlier historiography; they simply ignored it. Kramer
does initially acknowledge the complex relationship between fundamental
law and natural law ideas, but then follows John Reid's insistence that
"[n]atural law simply was not a significant part of the American Whig constitutional case; certainly not nearly as important as some twentieth-century
writers have assumed. '22 Perhaps Reid is correct. At least he seriously
confronted this alternative historiography. But after more than a generation
of mostly silence on this question, we need to take another serious look at
the role of natural law/natural rights thinking in the period leading up to the
Framing. It is certainly hard to understand the Bill of Rights without it. On
19. Id. at 273 n.87.
20. See MICHAEL KAMMEN,

A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN

AMERICAN CULTURE (1986).
21. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW (Cornell Univ. Press 1955) (1928-1929).
22. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 37 (quoting JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 14 (abr. ed. 1995)).
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the other hand, Kramer is the first scholar ever to make sense of the Ninth
Amendment. It does seem to presuppose a special agency for the people in
vindicating constitutional rights, not simply the higher law versions of
Rutledge and Murphy in Adamson 23 as refocused by Justice Goldberg in
24
Griswold v. Connecticut.
Beginning with the discussion of judicial review after the Revolution,
the second thesis of Kramer's book begins to emerge. He draws a sharp
distinction between judicial supremacy-or the view that the Supreme
Court possesses the exclusive authority to decide the meaning of the Constitution-and more decentralized modes of constitutional interpretation, of
which the departmental theory, allocating interpretative authority to each of
the three branches of government, represents the most prominent alternative. The latter, he immediately concedes, is an authentic expression of
popular constitutionalism; judicial supremacy is not. The book seeks to
trace the gradual emergence of judicial supremacy.
The early discussion is marked by a healthy suspicion of claims to an
unspoken consensus on the legitimacy of judicial review and an emphasis
on the continuing vitality of constitutional interpretation by the "people
outdoors." But as judicial review finds ever wider acceptance, Kramer begins to concede more ground, finally attaching himself to the departmental
theory as the major institutional expression of popular constitutionalism. In
a while, we will ask how much practical difference there is between judicial supremacy and the departmental theory.
Kramer's rich discussion of state judicial review between the Revolution and the Philadelphia Convention follows the accounts of Gordon
Wood, William Nelson, and William Treanor, among others. He rightly
emphasizes the considerable popular (or is it legislative?) resistance to
judicial review. And, like others, he sees the first signs of a modern theory
of judicial review in James Iredell's argument in the North Carolina case of
Bayard v. Singleton25 and in James Varnum's pamphlet on the Rhode Island case of Trevett v. Weeden. 26 He sharply contrasts these cases with
Judge Duane's narrow Bonhams-like effort at statutory interpretation in the
27
New York case of Rutgers v. Waddington.
23. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787).
26. See JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT v. WEEDEN (1787), reprinted in I BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 417 (1971).
27. See I THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 392

(Julius Goebel Jr. et al. eds., 1964) (reprinting Rutgers v. Waddington, a 1784 case before the New York
City Mayor's Court).
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The long-standing interest in the dozen or so state cases involving judicial review during the eleven years before the meeting in Philadelphia
had once been driven by the question of the Framer's intentions concerning
judicial review. Gordon Wood, instead, highlighted the shift on the eve of
the constitutional convention to a theory of popular sovereignty as the justification for judicial review. 28 Anticipating the arguments of Hamilton in
30
The FederalistNo. 7829 and John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,
the theory of popular sovereignty was appropriated by the Federalists to
develop an agency theory of separation of powers.
Because Kramer is so eager to read The FederalistNo. 78 as compatible with a departmental theory, he is not sufficiently skeptical of the ideological character of the Federalists' turn to popular sovereignty to justify
judicial review in the first place. It was not the last time in American history that conservatives invoked the will of the people to justify restrictions
on democracy. And because Kramer's mega-thesis has led him to see popular constitutionalism as "there all along," he is not listening for a shift from
parliamentary to popular sovereignty that, according to Wood, triggers the
Federalist theory ofjudicial review.
His excellent account of the Constitutional Convention and the state
ratifying debates is very illuminating. He rightly focuses on the Great Silence in the constitutional text concerning judicial review, which must
make any conscientious originalist writhe with anxiety. He shows in the
specific context of the debates in Philadelphia that while the Framers selfconsciously addressed the question of judicial review of state legislation
when they adopted the Supremacy Clause, their failure to be at all explicit
about so-called horizontal review of congressional legislation-in the face
of James Wilson's explicit promptings-should lead us to suppose that it
was unintended. Moreover, he rightly criticizes Raoul Berger's overreading
of many comments made at the Philadelphia convention as favoring judicial review. According to Kramer's count "no more than ten out of fiftyfive" delegates even expressed themselves on the question of judicial review, though many of the most thoughtful delegates were among the ten. 3 1
He also presents a rich survey of the voluminous state ratifications debates,
concluding that there was only "a smattering of references to judicial re32
view" in all of the state discussions.

28. See generally WOOD, supra note 17.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
30. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 317 (1819).
31.

KRAMER, supra note 1, at 73.

32. Id. at 83.
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The traditional debates on the legitimacy of judicial review always
ended with an originalist inquiry into the framing and ratification of the
Constitution between 1787 and 1789. What occurred after those dates was
treated as hardly relevant in shedding light on the framer's intentions, even
33
if it did prepare the way for Marbury v. Madison.
Because Kramer is intent on showing the primacy of a departmental
theory even before Marbury v. Madison, he is sensitive to the postRatification shift-at least among the Federalist legal elite-in favor of
judicial review, and, even more important, towards the Hamilton-Marshall
view of separation of powers as the people's delegation of limited powers
to each of the three branches. This is the so-called agency theory from
which the departmental theory of judicial review is also ultimately derived.
Kramer makes another very important related point. He maintains that it
was only in the 1790s that the Federalists, making their last stand, developed the argument for judicial review as protection against tyranny of the
majority. By the time Marbury is decided, Kramer acknowledges, judicial
review had come to enjoy widespread support that it never had during the
constitution-making period. Certainly, at the state level, despite the early
protest of Judge Gibson of Pennsylvania, there was relatively smooth sailing towards judicial review of state legislation by the 1820s.
The account of the gradual triumph of judicial review, however, often
fails to take account of another striking silence in constitutional history,
almost the equivalent of the silence about judicial review in the constitutional text. Whatever the persuasiveness of Marshall's justification for judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, how do we explain the fact that it
took fifty-four years, until the Dred Scott Case,34 before the Supreme Court
next exercised its power to declare congressional statutes unconstitutional.
Too eager to see in the departmental theory the next phase in popular constitutionalism, Kramer accepts judicial review before the Civil War as more
well-established and legitimate than the facts would indicate.
Kramer's treatment of federalism as a central structural expression of
popular constitutionalism raises a theoretical problem that pervades
Kramer's exposition. Though he is not at all insensitive to the relationship
between theory and practice or between the law in books and the law in
action, federalism is a place where I feel his acceptance of states' rights
arguments as expressing Jeffersonian localism fails to correct for the distorting mega-influence of slavery on Southern constitutional theory. Just as
there is reason to question the Federalists embrace of popular sovereignty
33. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
34. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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to legitimate judicial review, so too one must be skeptical about the origins
in popular constitutionalism of nullification and the compact theory of the
Constitution.
Likewise, aside from his excellent synthesis of the scholarly literature
on colonial mobs, Kramer's development of popular constitutionalism is
seriously lacking in grounding in colonial social history. Suppose we accept the standard version of a colonial society that was based on hierarchy
and social deference. In such a society, it would be difficult to believe that
constitutional forms, however they might be interpreted, would be expressing, above all, a commitment to popular constitutionalism.
To borrow from Morgan's Inventing the People,35 which Kramer frequently cites, the idea of the people is a fiction that has been deployed under radically different circumstances. It succeeded in the eighteenth century
absorption of Locke's social contract theory into a Whig system of elite
rule resting on the narrowest of electoral bases. This raises the question of
whether Kramer needed to go the full length of establishing "popular constitutionalism" in order to legitimate the departmental theory. Hamilton,
after all, was able to derive judicial review from the fact that each of the
three branches of government were agents of the people, who had delegated to each of the three departments limited shares of the people's plenary power. For Hamilton, it was enough that popular sovereignty could
express itself in a one-time-only ratification process. That was enough to
justify a departmental theory of judicial review on agency grounds.
Finally, I wonder if Kramer's success in demonstrating widespread
antebellum acceptance of the departmental theory as the true interpretation
of the power of judicial review makes all that much difference. I do recall
my teachers, both in graduate school and law school, focusing on the
statement of judicial supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron36 and emphasizing the
rarity of its claims. They did emphasize that the departmental theory was an
alternative interpretation that had always been available and had often been
invoked by presidents. Kramer acknowledges Madison's skepticism of the
practicality of the departmental theory, given the fact that courts usually
have the last word based on the typical sequence of controversies. As a
result, most successful claims under the departmental theory will result
from no more than the accidents of timing.
I wish Kramer had spent more time on the details of the congressional
debates over the constitutionality of the extension of slavery from the Mis35. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).

36. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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souri Compromise of 1820 to the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. During
that period, until a desperate, deadlocked Congress appealed to the Supreme Court to resolve the question in the Dred Scott Case, we have perhaps the only real example of the departmental theory in action, where,
over a thirty-four year period, there was arguably an actual consensus that
Congress represented the primary authority for resolving the constitutional
questions concerning extension of slavery into the territories. In Kramer's
terms, it represented a "politico-legal" perception of the constitutional
question. But it didn't work, in part, because it represented too unstable and
impermanent a resolution. Kramer acknowledges that the attraction of judicial supremacy is that it holds out promise of authoritative resolution of
constitutional questions that the departmental theory could never promise.
I'm not sure I come away from reading this book quite understanding
all of the real world consequences of a departmental theory as compared to
judicial supremacy. As Madison saw, having the last word makes you, as a
practical matter, supreme in fact. Moreover, because the most frequent
exponents of the departmental theory are presidents, I wonder whether the
practical effect of a departmental theory is not primarily to strengthen the
legitimacy of the claim to unfettered executive power in an Imperial Presidency. Indeed, compared to an expanded political question doctrine, the
departmental theory seems too random in its effect on limiting judicial
power. A political question doctrine sensitive to whether particular powers
"have been committed by the Constitution to another department of Government" would seem to map more closely onto our concerns with judicial
supremacy than the more fluctuating and spasmodic appeals of the departmental theory.

